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NEGLECTED MODES OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
SUPPOSING that two countries, having a dispute to settle,
agree to refer it to the decision of a third party, but without
binding themselves necessarily to adopt that decision, what is the
proper name of the transaction?
What name, that is, is least misleading to the ordinary person who may find it used? Surely arbitration most fittingly
covers these cases of recurrence to the benefit of a third opinion,
which in all but their consequences so closely resemble reference
to the obligatory determination of a third party. In both cases
the procedure is exactly the same-the parties desire a definite
pronouncement as to which of them is in the right, and they set
about obtaining it in exactly the same way, only in one case they
bind themselves to abide by the decision-in the other case they
leave it to have its moral weight.
This is not slight-for if your own chosen referee has pronounced against you, you can without loss of dignity pay up and
look pleasant. The invocation of the opinion of a third party has
a powerful influence-and it may very well happen that a nation
will consent to take such an opinion and in the end will very
probably abide by it, where it would think twice and thrice before
committing itself to abide by it in advance.
Mr. Merignhac would call such a proceeding "mediation"
and although we should not quarrel about names, yet we think
that such nomenclature has the unfortunate effect of slurring
over the existence ;ind uselessness of this kind of open arbitration. It is not in the least like mediation as the term is generally
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understood: and if it is shut up in the same box with it, the result
will be that it will be neglected and forgotten. Merignhac shuts
it up in the mediation box because he has made up his mind that
arbitration must be decisive on the parties, but it differs from
mediation toto coelo. In mediation the third party endeavors
to compose the differences between the parties. He takes the
initiative, suggests compromises, presses concessions, listens to
considerations outside the subject-matter in dispute, introduces
considerations of morality and good-neighborliness, and acts, in
short, as a friend and advisor rather than as a jurist. In arbitration, the third party says (or should say) simply who is right
and who is wrong. There is nothing in common between it and
mediation.
This is not to confuse mediation with good offices. The
power (or powers) which tenders its good offices to disputants does not concern itself with the points which are in
dispute, but only with the means of settling them. It interposes
at the request of one or other, or spontaneously, to dissuade
from war or mobilization-to suggest reasons of conciliatory
settlement-to propose disarmament, mediation, arbitration or
some step which will place a check on war.
Few, if any, instances of such arbitration as has been mentioned exist in history, and yet one must recognize that, especially
in the more vital and important classes of dispute a reference of
this kind might prove of the greatest value. It is seldom that a
nation can contemplate calmly the irrevocable submission of its
case in an important matter to three or four gentlemen, however eminent, or to any municipal court, however august. But
if it referred the case to the candid opinion of expert friends,
it would be easy as regards the result; whilst at the same time,
if their opinion should be against it, it might well proceed to
accept it. Turbulent elements in the state would be checked
by the citation of the arbitrators' decision. The natural reluctance of the government to yield to external force or threats
would be replaced by a comparative willingness to yield to enlightened outside opinions.
Two individuals quarrel. Neither can induce the other to
give way. Without washing their dirty linen in public, and
subjecting each other to the compulsion of sheriff and constable,
they, like sensible people, invoke the opinion of a common and
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trusted friend-perhaps (and indeed very often) an honest
lawyer. "Well, if he says you are right, I suppose you must be
right, though I can't see it myself," says the one party, and
gives way, where nothing could have induced him to alter his
own opinion. This is surely a procedure which international laws
might well encourage, rather than smother under a misleading
nomenclature.
Much must always turn, in international as in other arbitration, on the personality of the arbitrators. In a reference for
opinion, this is particularly important-since it is in the value
which the parties have for the opinion of the arbitrator that its
importance consists. In the case of decisive arbitration, where
the parties bind themselves to accept the judgment, the case may
be wrongly decided, but at any rate it is decided. But in consultative arbitration (as it may be styled), the whole force, or
nearly the whole force, of the proceeding depends on the disputants' confidence in the competence of the arbitrator. Some
weight comes also from the natural unwillingness to stultify
oneself in the eyes of the world by refusing to accept the determination of one's own appointed referee :-but this again rests
in the long run on his accepted fitness.
A great deal more stress should be laid than has hitherto
been the custom, on the personal qualifications of those who are
selected as arbitrators. This has a vicious historical reason. As
states are disputants, it was at first natural and common that
states should be the arbitrators; nothing less seemed calculated
to satisfy their dignity. But as states could not literally act as
arbitrators the choice, equally naturally, fell on sovereigns, and
sovereigns, not being personally conversant with or much
caring to be troubled with the details in dispute, chose any
decently competent person to prepare their decision for them.
It is obvious that in such a state of things the disputants have
no special confidence in the real arbitration ;-they only have
confidence that it will be the choice of a personage whom they
trust. This system was succeeded by one in which the sovereign
was expected to do openly what he no doubt did privately and
the dispute was referred to an un-named person to be named
by him. Here also the parties may have a fair guarantee of
impartiality and competence-but they clearly have no special
trust and confidence in the personal qualities of the referee, fothey do not know who he is.
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A far better system would be frankly to recognize that it is
really individuals who decide these cases, and that their individual characters and capacities are transcendently important.
That an arbitrator is a Portuguese or a Norwegian is nothing
beside the fact that he has a judicial, an instructed, and a patient
temperament. An eminently judicial, instructed and patient
temperament is what the disputants want,--and the fact that the
arbitrator is a supreme court judge will not of itself secure it,
nor will the fact that his government has a high opinion of his
ability, based on his usefulness to them in some quite different
sphere of activity.
We have spoken of "the arbitration" in the singular; for it
is a remarkable and regrettable fact that arbitrators chosen by
single parties or by sovereigns nominated by single parties, almost
invariably reduce themselves to the position of advocates at the
table. Such arbitrators with a mission-to secure the advocacy
of their own cause-should never be admitted. If once the
rational system were well established of selecting arbitrators for
their own personal competence, there would be little or no reason
for the exclusion of persons of the nationality of one or both
disputants. Such a person as the late Lord Courtney in England, or Carl Schurz in America, might well have commanded
confidence in any mind. At the same time one would not
necessarily have taken Lord Courtney's opinion on a point of
navigation, or Mr. Schurz's on a military proposition. Technical
competence must be a matter to be considered. A dispute on a
question of conveyancing needs quite different qualities for its
solution from those which are useful in establishing the truth
in conflicts of evidence.
With those qualifications, the neglected process of referring
disputes for a friendly but not necessarily binding decision may
be seriously recommended for adoption.
A further word may be added on defects which seem to exist
in the usual type of arbitral body.
In the first place, it imitates too closely the procedure and the
de haut en bas attitude of a municipal court. This is not the
place to attack or to examine the propriety of that attitude
assumed by municipal judges. Everybody is conscious of it:the judge, carrying out the traditions of a day when the sovereign sat on the bench, regards the parties and their advocates
with an Olympic air. Even where the bar is highly capable and
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highly organized this attitude of the judicial person subsists. It
subsists in Britain, and anyone who needs the rebuke to which
David Dudley Field and his colleagues submitted to listen to a
not very distinguished judge, will agree that it has its place in
America. Where a court sits to exercise jurisdiction over a vast
mass of populace, such an attitude may have its merits, but
where arbitrators sit to determine by consent a dispute between
two or three of a circle of fifty friends it is entirely out of place.
An international tribunal has to determine disputes between
states. If it arrogates to itself the lofty attitude of municipal
judges it goes far to reduce them to the level of subjects. An
international arbitration ought to be conducted on terms of the
fullest equality: the advocate of the sovereign litigant ought to
argue on equal terms with the arbitrators. He ought not to stand
before them. He ought not to be told to be silent by them. This
is partly why nations cling to the bad practice of appointing
arbitrators who are practically national advocates: they secure
their dignity thereby. But those who appear before an arbitral
body to represent the interests of a sovereign state ought to
yield in no substantial or formal respect to those who appear
to give their arbitral decision. It may be objected that, on
such a footing, the proceedings will fall into hopeless confusion. If the advocates appointed by a litigant nation throw
the conduct of the case into confusion, then they stultify the
reference and expose their country to the charge of failing
to fulfill its engagements. If the arbitrators do the like, they
fail in their duty. This ought to be sufficient to secure a
proper conduct of business, without enthroning the arbitrator
as a dictatorial judge. An international arbitration ought to be
a friendly discussion; not a tournament of wits under judicial
dictation.
It ought to be possible for advocates to converse freely and
familiarly with the persons who will decide the matter. They
should be hampered by no considerations of an unreal and conventional respect for the superior position of the board. The
ideal would be for all to sit together at a round table in armchairs.
In the second place, the imitation of law courts has probably
been carried too far in the adoption of a small fixed number of
arbitrators for all classes of disputes. There are some disputes
so far-reaching and delicate that it is not safe or fair to entrust
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them to the decision of a majority of three lawyers. One wants,
to decide such matters, something which will fairly represent the
sense of justice of the whole world. I am not alluding to the
distinction sometimes drawn between "justiciable" and "nonjusticiable" disputes: I am old fashioned enough to believe that
in any dispute a nation is either right or wrong, and that if it
can be judicially declared to be wrong it is its business to make
the best of it. But, even so, a great national question is not to
be settled by the opinion of two or three majority jurists, however
eminent. Jurists are apt to have eccentric views on particular
topics. F. F. de Martens, who is not inferior to any of his
contemporaries, gave a decision in The Costa Rica. Packet which
would hardly have been concurred in by many of the rest, and
international jurists are particularly apt to be carried away by
academic and impractical dogmatism. Statesmen are the real
authorities on the law of nations-and they, again, are liable to
be warped by political considerations and prepossessions. Accordingly it would seem that far greater elasticity in the composition of boards of international arbitration might well be introduced. For some disputes a single well-equipped technical
authority would be sufficient, for others the conventional majority
of two or three, for others a unanimous four or five.
But, for the most important class of differences a far more
representative opinion is required. It might be secured by forming a sort of international jury. Each side might arrange the
countries of the world in order of preference, and from the
twelve highest in both lists might make a mutual selection of
twelve or twenty-four thoroughly impartial and able persons to
give their considered opinion after hearing the advocates of both
sides. Such an Areopagus might command an influence which
would ultimately crystallize into the formation of a regular
tribunal whose seat, as Lorimer, the Edinburgh professor, suggested might well be fixed, with sovereign rights at Constantinople. For the same personages would probably be chosen again
and again. But whether it did so or not-and perhaps it is to be
deprecated that it should-the decision of such a specially selected
body would carry far greater weight than the ipsi dixerunt of
two or three individuals.
Elasticity is what is wanted. Elasticity in the referencemaking it possible to refer for an opinion as well as for a decree.
Elasticity in the procedure-dethroning the dictatorial procedure
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of municipal courts and introducing the frank familiarity of a
cabinet. Elasticity in the staff-fitting the composition of the
tribunal to the relative importance and delicacy of the work in
hand.
It is confidently suggested that these neglected elements in a
satisfactory system of arbitration are well worth the attention
of statesmen and jurists, and that their introduction with practice
would enormously set forward the popularity of arbitral settlement.
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